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ABSTRACT
Transforming Leader Selection in the U.S. Army—The Battalion Command Selection Program
by
Joseph Michael Williams
December 2022
Chair: Dr. Satish Nargundkar
Major Academic Unit: Doctorate in Business Administration
As an institution, the Army has not always done a stellar job of recognizing and retaining
the most talented individuals including not investing sufficient time in identifying what qualities
were most desirable. This is even more true in the methods utilized in selecting officers for
battalion command. Many argue battalion command is one of the most consequential
assignments because of the outsized impact on a unit’s mission accomplishment and its people.
Because some toxic leaders were still slipping through the gaps of the legacy battalion
command selection process, the Army introduced an audacious new initiative called the
Battalion Command Assessment Program (BCAP). In 2019, the Army’s newly created Army
Talent Management Task Force (ATMTF) transformed the battalion selection process. This
involved moving from a legacy data poor environment into a transformative data rich
environment. It included taking very seriously the principles of fairness, consistency, and safety
utilizing extraordinary measures in reducing the variables involved in the process.
This paper explores if the recently implemented Army Battalion Command Assessment
Program (BCAP) leader selection process. Interviews were conducted with Army personnel at
three levels – those at the strategic level in charge of making this change, those implementing the
BCAP program, and those that were assessed through the program. This data was analyzed to
compare the BCAP selection process with the one that preceded it, and insights gained into the
pros and cons of the BCAP selection process. The BCAP process involves identifying and

xiii

selecting officers having stronger cognitive and non-cognitive aptitudes, better communication
abilities, higher levels of physical fitness, and exhibiting fewer toxic leadership demeanors.
The study contributes to the practice of leader selection by analyzing two different ways
of doing so and comparing the outcomes.
For future study, a longitudinal analysis will help determine if the program is a success in
the long term. The Army developed a cohesive framework for gathering data to obtain answers
to certain questions for selecting the best qualified officers. Now will begin learning whether
they were asking the right questions involving any of these linkages by analyzing the data they
collect.

INDEX WORDS: Battalion Command; Talent Management; Transformation; Leader Selection;
Toxic Leader; Counterproductive Leader.

1

I

INTRODUCTION

“If your actions inspire others to dream more, learn more,
do more and become more, you are a leader.”
– John Quincy Adams
Many business enterprises and government organizations, including the US Army, are
talking about the war for talent being critically important in being able to achieve success. The
Department of Defense is the largest employer in the United States, yet until the last several
years never used the term ‘we are in a war for talent’, because they don't even think they are in a
competition for talent. But the reality is, the Army is truly in a war for talented leaders, as well as
those Soldiers they are leading.
Creating the Army Talent Management Task Force (ATMTF) in 2016, was the Army’s
initial effort in formally recognizing the critical challenges they were facing in an ever changing
and diverse world. The United States strong economy was making it challenging for the Army in
meeting the minimum personnel acquisition requirements every year to man the force, while
simultaneously retaining the best leaders for leading the Army into future decades of uncertainty
around the globe and into space.
The intent of this qualitative research project involves an area of concern of interest to
me, currently relevant in the military sector of American society, and that could serve as the
foundation for the dissertation required for successful completion of all requirements for the
degree of Doctor in Business Administration. The format used in this dissertation is consistent
with an academic research paper that could be submitted to a journal for publication.
Following this introduction, is a basic review of the existing literature along with a broad
overview of the methods used to address the problem of too many battalion commanders not

2

successfully completing their tenured assignment, typically two years. The area of concern
involves poor leadership traits and behaviors that can, and often do, contribute to an environment
with negative results that can destroy the cohesiveness of an organization, both civilian and
military, with a detrimental effect on morale, and ultimately organizational performance and
results. The research question is: Has the recently implemented Army Battalion Command
Assessment Program (BCAP) leader selection process resulted in improved outcomes?
Because of my personal relationship in studying, researching, and writing on Army
leadership, I am presenting my work using first-person methods of writing and including mostly
active versus passive voice.
The area of concern deals with the United States Army, so consequently access to
Soldiers and other key leaders is necessary and vital in developing a deep and rich research
study. Getting buy-in from the necessary senior Army leaders was critical, along with
cooperation from their subordinates for accessing appropriate personnel to interview in order to
collect relevant and appropriate data.
The notion of identifying a select group of persons and providing them with special
resources and training to maximize their potential is common and widespread throughout
western society (Finkelstein, et al. 2019). High‐potential programs are part of the strategic talent
management process by which organizations distinguish, bring together, recruit, build, and retain
their best employees (Silzer & Dowell, 2009). Organizations considering, developing, or
adopting “high‐potential” programs, must cautiously consider the individualities, systems,
processes, and outcomes of their programs as well as any second and third order effects of a less
than rigorous approach to identifying and selecting individuals for insertion in such programs
(Geisel, 1961).
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In providing full transparency and revealing to the reader my potential biases as a
researcher, I will outline my personal background and involvement with the problem area of
ineffective, or toxic, leadership. During my 32-year Army career, I personally observed the full
spectrum of leadership styles ranging from toxic environments involving poor and non-existent
leader skills to extraordinary leaders that created a positive “can do” environment inspiring
subordinates, peers, and sometimes the more senior leaders, to meet and even exceed tactical,
operational, and strategic organizational objectives.
Prior to my high school senior year, I enlisted in my hometown Army National
Guard1 (ARNG) unit in Kansas. My first real exposure to different leadership styles were
techniques utilized by the Drill Sergeants during a 13-week iteration of One Station Unit
Training2 (OSUT) for Cavalry Scouts.
After completing OSUT and released from active duty and deciding to forego
college, I accepted a Manager Trainee position for Alco Discount Stores, a competitor of
Walmart. This was my introduction to basic management training in a retail environment,
involving a formal 24-month training program for preparing individuals to become store
managers. This endeavor allowed me to begin understanding the differences between
leadership and management, including working for a store manager with a toxic
management style.
At age19, I attended the Army Infantry Officer Candidate School (OCS), my first
formal leadership training exposing me again to the various styles and techniques of

1

The National Guard (NG) members typically perform duties one-weekend per month along with a two-week
period of Annual Training (AT) each year, as part of the Army’s Selected Reserve, a sub element of the Total U.S.
Army, to be called upon during periods of war, and also for State emergencies determined by the Governor
2
OSUT combined Basic Combat Training (BCT) of eight weeks with Advanced Individual Training (AIT) of five
weeks into a single initial entry training (IET) program.
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individual leaders, while concurrently training the candidates in the Army “schoolhouse”
methods of desired leadership tactics, techniques, and procedures required of Army
leaders. Upon graduating and commissioning as Second Lieutenants (2LT) in the U.S.
Army, the lowest rank of all officers as depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1 U.S. Army Officer Rank Structure (U.S. Army)
Simultaneously with OCS, I began studying real estate and insurance, and was
hired as a real estate agent in my hometown while still serving one-weekend per month as
a Tank Platoon Leader, where I was directly responsible for 19 Soldiers and five M60
main battle tanks.
At age 22, I opened my own business Williams Real Estate & Insurance, while still
performing my military duties and one year later I purchased a Century 21 real estate
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franchise and transferred from KsARNG3 to the United States Army Reserve4 (USAR).
Moving forward, I continued attending formal leadership and technical training by
the Army, while also completing civilian management courses. All of these experiences
continued in allowing me to compare and contrast different and various leadership styles
and techniques.
Certain Army assignments impacted me more than others, such as conducting
humanitarian and civic action duties in rural Honduras, and later deploying to the Kuwaiti
Theater of Operations for Desert Storm in the early 1990s.
Later, as a Lieutenant Colonel, I was deputy commanding officer of a support
brigade consisting of 28 subordinate units and nearly 3,000 Soldiers. Next was three years
as a staff officer at Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe in Heidelberg, Germany and then to
Fort Lewis, Washington. In 2002, I was promoted to Colonel and assigned as the
Commanding Officer of a Logistics Task Force.
Following my command tour, I was selected as a Senior Army War College
Fellow, and assigned as a National Security Fellow at Harvard University for one year, and
subsequently assigned to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Department
of the Army, The Pentagon, for two years before retiring in 2007.
In 1997 and 2002, I had the opportunity to serve on two separate Department of the Army
(DA) level promotion and selection boards providing me with firsthand practical experience in
the conduct of these boards and providing me the necessary motivation for this dissertation
research project.

3

State-led force reporting to the Governor
Federal forces reporting to the President of the United States performing military duties one-weekend per month
and two weeks annually
4
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I.1

Transitioning from personal relevant history to literature interpretation.
Most military organizations have predominantly strong cultures and even

stronger sub-cultures (Holmes-Eber, 2014; Johnson, 2018; Kelly, 2008). These cultures
are deeply intertwined with traditions and artifacts, such as rituals and ceremonies
(Builder, 1989; Hawkins, 2015; Johnson, 2018; Piscitelli, 2017). Such strong cultures,
“while stable and lasting, are also hard to change” (Schein, 2017, p. 343), and, in a
tempestuous world, this might be a danger. Often, culture is seen as the issue holding
organizations in the past and hindering change (Builder, 1989; Davidson, 2010; Hanson,
2001; Nielsen, 2014). Forward-moving organizations with robust cultures and
subcultures forward into new situations demands a variation not of their existing
cultures, but through the variation of their organizational learning systems (Davidson,
2010). Nevertheless, any change must be an adaptation that is particularly coherent with
the organizational existence, defining traditions and values (Schein, 1984).
Consequently, this study, informed by the Theory of Action (ToA) (Argyris & Schön,
1974, 1978, 1996), investigates how existing systems, not simply philosophy, impacts a
military organization’s efforts to adapt to and address transformative personnel
challenges through the employment of a strategic initiative to strengthen a leadership
philosophy.
I have taken the essential measures to account for and assuage any biases and these
are addressed in Chapter III: Case Method, Chapter IV: Case Results, and Chapter V:
Discussion, under the limitations section. While acknowledging my biases, I have taken
steps to mitigate my up-close perspective of the problem area of ineffective leadership and
I conducted this study to illustrate the goals and methods within the Army leadership in
providing an academic practioner view of their efforts in transforming the leader selection
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process of the future. It is through the lenses of various experiences and training, and by
questioning what is known about a subject in a new way, that utilizing transformational
aspirations we can effect changes that can have profound impacts upon an institution such
as the U.S. Army.
I.2

Purpose of the Study
The research question: Has the recently implemented Army Battalion Command

Assessment Program (BCAP) leader selection process resulted in improved outcomes?
“The Army’s Command Assessment Programs (CAP) mark a bold step forward
to ensure that our most talented officers are selected for command and key billets.
These programs reflect the Army's changing paradigm on the selection of future commanders
and strategic leaders. It currently consists of two programs:
the Colonels Command Assessment Program (CCAP) and the Battalion Commander Assessment
Program (BCAP).”
Joseph P. McGee Major General,
U.S. Army Director, Army Talent Management Task Force
(U.S. Army Preparation Guide for BCAP&CCAP, 2020)
The purpose of this study is to create insights and knowledge into a recently implemented
Army Battalion Command Assessment Program (BCAP) leader selection process with the goal
of improved outcomes of selecting personnel to lead U.S. Army organizations, hopefully
resulting in higher rates of success in completing tenured assignments, while also adding to the
existing body of knowledge regarding leader selection improvement methods. Ultimately, this
research could open up possibilities for me to leverage the knowledge acquired for follow-on
opportunities primarily with the U.S. Army in perhaps a consulting role, and even with civilian
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enterprises who sometimes model their leadership development programs, and management
styles after the military. The potential contributions from this research involve both theory and
practice. This study makes contributions to the existing body of knowledge of transformational
leadership theory. From a practical application for the U.S. Army, poor and mediocre leadership
continues to resonate exceedingly high on the concerns of senior Army leadership that continues
exploring ways to reduce or mitigate the effects of destructive, sometimes referred to as toxic or
ineffective, leaders and is extremely focused on identifying individuals possessing traits and
characteristics that might predict ineffective leadership behaviors that could be used in
eliminating them from consideration from future key leadership assignments.
Traditionally Army selection boards, called ‘legacy’ boards, only involved a review of
paper files until the late 1990s when they transitioned to digital electronic records for leader
selection and promotion boards. Applicants were not authorized to personally appear before the
board; therefore, board members couldn’t address the applicants in person or ask them any
questions. The selection process only permitted a truly short cursory review of materials,
involving approximately two minutes being spent by each of the board members (Boards were
generally comprised of an odd number of officers ranging from 25 to 29) to privately review
each individual file before assigning a numerical value ranging from 1 to 6, with six being the
maximum value allowed. Conversation among Board members relative to any individual, or their
files and records was specifically forbidden, to avoid the appearance of favoritism, or in the
cases of underachievers to unnecessarily influence other Board members. A deeper dive into
these files wasn’t possible, with the primary focus being on previous duty performance;
education (civilian and military); prior duty assignments and positions of responsibility; any
awards received; evaluating a full-length recent photo of the applicant for compliance with
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uniform requirements, grooming and fitness standards, and finally the potential for successfully
serving at the next higher rank. My personal experience in this area is supported by prior
academic research involving the application of a comprehensive needs’ assessment model
(Wedman. 2010).
I.3

U.S. Military Organizational Structure
The U.S. military is a collection of five service branches with various viewpoints in

developing leader capabilities, with each exploring various methodologies in developing
servicemember leadership competencies (Kirchner & Akdere. 2017). Poor and mediocre
leadership traits and behaviors can, and often do, contribute to an environment with negative
results that can destroy the cohesiveness of an organization, both civilian and military, with
detrimental effects on morale, retention, and ultimately results and organizational performance.
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source DoD, 2020

Figure 2 Department of Defense (DoD) Organizational Structure
I.4

Leadership
Since leadership is such a universal phenomenon, thousands of leadership books have

been published, and probably tens of thousands of articles on leadership have appeared in
periodicals, academic scholarly journals, business journals, and newspapers, while the internet is
also flooded with material on leadership. No society has been found where leadership is
completely absent (Murdock. 1967). Developing a new breakthrough leadership theory and/or a
practical application for implementing creative and dynamic new tactics, techniques, and
procedures for overcoming poor or mediocre leadership styles of the magnitude likely to win a
Nobel prize is astronomically unlikely, so this paper addresses a small sampling of previously
published literature involving leadership in general, while also exploring the Army’s new
Battalion Command Assessment Program (BCAP).
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I.4.1

The Military Command Climate
The climate created by leaders sets the stage for how subordinates, both military

members and civilian employees, will engage and perform their assigned missions and duties. I
have personally encountered leaders who created hostile and destructive environments, who
violated their oath of office, cared more about themselves than their assigned personnel, lacked
the needed moral and ethical foundation to lead by example, among other things. I have also
been privileged to have served with exceptional leaders whose subordinates would follow them
anywhere, on and off the battlefield, who demonstrated high levels of integrity, motivation,
honesty, respect for others, and personal courage to do the right thing even when no one is
watching. Figure 3 depicts the Warrior Ethos expected of those serving in the Army, and is a
foundational unpinning of the traits, characteristics, and behaviors of those wearing the uniform.

source: Department of the Army

Figure 3 Army Warrior Ethos
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I.4.2

The Performance Pyramid
The Performance Pyramid (Figure 4) is a need’s assessment focusing on human systems

integration training needs in the U.S. Army—an organization that presented several of the
barriers typically encountered in needs assessments (Barker Steege, et al. 2012). This
performance pyramid was created by an early needs’ assessment methodologies focused on
training as the primary solution to performance problems (Wedman, 2010).
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Figure 4 The Performance Pyramid Framework’s Systematic Perspective on Performance
Improvement
(Wedman.2010)
One of the strengths of the Performance Pyramid (Figure 4) is its utility as a tool for
communication with stakeholders about systemic factors that influence performance; it provides
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analysts with a simple way to illustrate to stakeholders the performance analysis process and
factors that affect organizational outcomes beyond those related to knowledge and skills (Darabi,
2003).
The Army Leadership Requirements Model (LRM) shown in Figure 5 directly correlates
with Wedman’s performance pyramid and they complement each other, because of the nature
involving the principles of ‘be, know, do’ that the Army introduces to all Soldiers early on in
their military service.

Figure 5 Army Leadership Requirements Model
(FM 6-22. 2015)
I.5

The Importance of this Study.
Everybody’s searching for talent including the US Army. Assessing and selecting the

best talent needed for battalion commanders will provide leaders who are agile, capable,
physically fit, and think critically and strategically. Eliminating leaders utilizing toxic and
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destructive styles is without doubt key in fighting and winning our nation’s wars across a full
spectrum multi-domain environment.
I have organized the remainder of the dissertation into: Chapter II discussing the relevant
literature streams germane to this study. Chapter III explaining and defending the
methodological research approach for this study. Chapter IV detailing the findings from the
research work completed. Chapter V discussing the study’s contribution to academic and
managerial practice by detailing potential involvements to advance an organization’s
implementation of such a strategic initiative to effect change. Chapter VI is the conclusion.
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II

LITERATURE REVIEW

For decades, the U.S. Army has been concerned with identifying leaders who might have
“destructive leadership styles,” including a mandate in 2003 by then Secretary of the Army
Thomas E. White for the U.S. Army War College to conduct research in this area (Reed, 2004).
II.1 Toxicity
Subsequently, we find many references to toxic organizations, toxic managers, toxic
culture, and toxic leaders appearing regularly in management, leadership, and military journals
and publications (Reed, 2004). There are numerous impacts that toxic leaders can have on their
subordinates, such as subordinates emulating the toxic leaders’ style and traits that can advance a
destructive environment within an organization (Padilla, 2007). The word toxicity can be found
in terms such as “toxic leaders, toxic manager, and toxic organization” throughout the military
and business environments, and even day-to-day life (Reed, Olsen. 2010). Yet another definition
of toxic leaders are those individuals who, by virtue of their destructive behaviors and their
dysfunctional personal abilities or individualities, wreak serious and lasting harm on the
individuals, groups, organizations, and communities that they lead (Lipman-Blumen. 2005).
II.2 Selecting leaders
The phenomenon of selecting the right leaders, for the right organizations, and at the right
times, most likely precedes even the Revolutionary War. Rather than search for information
about the founding of the United States, I selected an academic article involving a later, but
nearly equal timeframe, World War II, and specifically the Office of Strategic Services (OSS),
which later became the current Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). For assessing candidates for
the OSS, they requested the assistance of clinical psychologists and psychiatrists in establishing
an assessment program for evaluating the suitability of prospective team members for inclusion
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into their organization. These teams established a unique and painstaking program to evaluate
OSS candidates. It is described in Assessment of Men: Selection of Personnel for the Office of
Strategic Services (OSS Assessment Staff, 1948). The U.S. military special operations
component of the OSS is recognized as the forerunner of the U.S Army Special Forces
(Lenzenweger, 2015).
During the OSS process they divided the candidates into small groups of approximately
18 who were sent to a secret location outside Washington, DC, where they were to accept new
identities. These candidates were prepared to answer questions by psychologists and psychiatrists
over a 72-hour period. The assessment number from 85-to 90 in establishing final ratings
involving 10 core dimensions. One such assessment involved a “construction situation,” with the
candidate endeavoring to assemble a small structure within 10 minutes. To complicate the task,
two “stooges” were assigned to the team with the mission of annoying the candidate, thereby
making completing the task within the allowable time as stressful and challenging as possible.
These types of tasks produced valuable observational data about the candidates allowing the staff
in forming their many observations. The results were categorized into seven broad conceptual
psychological categories: (a) motivation for the assignment, (b) energy and initiative, (c)
practical (effective) intelligence, (d) emotional stability, (e) social relationships, (f) leadership,
and (g) security, (h) physical ability, (i) observing and reporting, and (j) propaganda skills.
II.3 Destructive leadership
II.3.1 Defining destructive leadership.
This is a term that is being used with more frequency to describe some of the actions and
outcomes of leaders, many of whom could be considered toxic leaders. Although many social
scientists have avoided researching destructive leadership in the past, there seems to be a shifting
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into more researchers delving into this murky side of leadership styles. In one particular study,
the effects of destructive leaders combined with susceptible followers in conducive environments
was researched in an effort to better understand this destructive leader phenomenon. The leaders
were viewed through a lens involving their charisma, narcissism, need for power, destructive life
themes, and a philosophy of hate. The researchers concluded that there is probably no single
element that creates the traits of a destructive leader, who is generally driven by selfishness and
the need for personal recognition and power, but usually lacks the requisite stamina and skills
that result in them being widely recognized as a great leader. Even though most of these traits
must typically be present to create an environment of destructive leadership, they also recognized
that susceptible followers who were unwilling to stand up to these destructive leaders were
necessary, and it also depends upon a lack of checks and balances in an atmosphere devoid of
basic values that can be the bedrock for positive outcomes (Padilla, et al, 2007).
II.3.2 Army Command Policy.
Concerning the United States Army, leadership is the basis for their primary mission of
taking care of Soldiers and mission accomplishment. Consequently, the U.S. Army takes very
seriously the role of developing leaders for mission accomplishment through professional
education as well as mentoring by senior leaders. There are serious consequences when
leadership fails, and even greater consequences when the failure is caused by toxic leaders
(Steele, 2011).
Army regulation 600-20 states “Privilege to command. Command is exercised by virtue
of office and the special assignment of members of the United States Armed Forces to exercise
command. The commander is responsible for establishing a leadership climate of the unit and
developing disciplined and cohesive units.” The generally recognized standard throughout the
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United States military is primarily concerned with the "good order and discipline necessary for
mission accomplishment” (AR-600-20, 2014).
II.3.3 Assessing Army leadership quality.
An existing framework, created by the Center for Army Leadership, involving an Annual
Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL) began in 2005 assessing and tracking the trends into the
quality of leadership including the attitudes found in Army leader development, and how
leadership contributes to mission accomplishment. The Center for Army Leadership states their
“framework can be readily applied to research, assessment, education, and policies” (Steele,
2011).
In order to create and promote a positive environment, leaders must be committed to the
professional Army ethics including loyalty to the nation, the Army, and to the Soldiers in their
care, which also includes the Soldiers’ family members, caring for their well-being by
demonstrating genuine concern and thereby building a positive command climate. Duty is
another basic Army value requiring Soldiers possess a sense of purpose for accomplishing their
assigned tasks in an obedient and disciplined manner where they willingly accept responsibilities
from their superiors working together for mission accomplishment rather than any personal selfinterest. Integrity is a value necessary for consistently dependable performance, including
decision making and delegating authority to others, all while doing the right thing even when no
one is watching. Other necessary Army values needed by competent leaders include: respect for
self, superiors, and subordinates; selfless service in placing the needs of the nation, unit, and
others before your own personal needs; honesty involves always telling the truth, and never
lying, cheating, or stealing, nor tolerating those who do; personal courage is the value associated
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with doing the right thing, whether in peacetime or war, regardless of the risk to one’s own
personal health and welfare (AR 600-20, 2014).
II.3.4 Developing Army leaders.
For the Army to properly develop its’ leaders, a basic framework was developed in June
2015: “The Army depends upon itself to develop adaptable leaders able to achieve mission
accomplishment in dynamic, unstable, and complex environments. Through a mix of education,
training, and experience, Army leader development processes produce and sustain agile,
adaptive, and innovative leaders who act with boldness and initiative in dynamic, complex
situations to execute missions according to doctrine, orders, and training. Properly designed
leader development programs develop trusted leaders of character, competence, and
commitment. The goal is to develop Army leaders who clearly provide purpose, direction,
motivation, and vision to their teams and subordinates while executing missions to support their
commander’s intent” (FM 6-22. 2015).
Consequently, toxic leaders have the opposite effect upon unit performance and mission
accomplishment since they are generally focused on making themselves look good at the
expense of their subordinates, creating long-term consequences to their Soldiers, their
organization, and the Army as a whole (Steele, 2011).
Another tool used for small units (company-sized elements) is the Command Climate
Survey, which is typically administered within 30 days of assuming command and again six
months later, and annually thereafter. This survey is voluntary above the company level. Since
the initial survey is introduced shortly after a change of command, the results are seen as a
beginning point for assessing and improving the unit’s command climate. All survey answers are
treated as confidential, and results are never reported to provide elements of security over
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potential acts of retribution. Only subgroups containing at least five individuals are reported and
the outcomes are calculated for the company commander’s use and are not reported up the chain
of command (AR 600-20, appendix D. 2014).
The Center for Army Leadership has significant resources to plan their research, and then
implement the plan, collecting and analyzing the data, and reaching conclusions, well beyond the
capabilities of one single researcher. Their annual survey of Army leadership in 2010 utilized
quantitative and qualitative data obtained from a random and representative sampling involving
Soldiers in rank from Sergeant to Colonel (N=1186), and Army civilian employees (N=923).
With a staff of several researchers, including trained psychologists, along with ready access to
the participants since this was a mandated and sanctioned Army study, they were able to conduct
deep and rich research, while also having the time, knowledge, skill, and abilities to properly
analyze their findings, resulting in conclusions that made a significant contribution to the
existing body of knowledge involving toxic leadership in the Army (Steele, 2011).
II.4 On-going leadership research.
Leadership research continues based upon scholarly and practitioner studies, in
universities as well as businesses, including consulting firms, directed at training future leaders,
while improving existing leaders’ skills. An on-going question is if leadership is a trait,
characteristic, skill and is it intuitive or a behavior someone is born with? Some suggest
leadership can only be acquired through formal training and practical experience. (Doh, 2003).
This sometimes resonates as to whether leaders are born or made. (Bass, 1997).
There has been a notable rise in new leadership methods and trends, involving a much
larger focus on the perspective in which the leader learns, thereby creating individual leaders
who can successfully navigate and function in a global environment leveraging technology, all
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while thinking of newer and more creative ways to ensure leaders succeed. Events like coaching,
mentoring, and action learning are now generally considered to be particularly effective in
developing subordinates. When combining these activities with a 360-degree feedback
mechanism and integrating into a subordinate’s day-to-day tasks, these methods can significantly
contribute to leadership growth of these individuals. (Hernez-Broome, et al, 2004).
Increased research into how best to implement basic leadership behaviors of
consideration and initiating structure into leadership development with positive leadership
outcomes to create better follower satisfaction, leader effectiveness, and motivation is on-going.
This is also closely aligned with whether strong leader performance is correlated to stronger
organization performance (Judge, et al, 2004). It is now much simpler to systematically spread
leadership approaches using multiple media platforms on a global scale (Bass, 1997).
Research focusing on strengths-based development in helping leaders become better
investigates whether leaders overuse their strengths while limiting the use of their lesser
developed skills, does this reduce the true effectiveness of what is considered their stronger
skills, traits, and characteristics? This is particularly relevant since many leaders willingly and
knowingly avoid utilizing areas in which they feel weak and inferior. Rather than focusing on
improving these weaknesses and turning them into strengths that could make them better, wellrounded leaders, rather than the lop-sided leaders they are (Kaiser & Overfield, 2011).
There are almost daily news stories reporting on local, national, and global leaders in
business, religion, and politics abusing their power and authority, usually for their own purposes
or self-interest over what is best for the organization and its’ stockholders/stakeholders and
employees (Padilla, et al, 2007). The United States military has been no exception, with many
reports of leaders who misuse government resources, engage in inappropriate relationships, and
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abuse subordinates. The army revised its leader selection process in recent years, creating the
BCAP process to replace the old process. This research examines the details of the new process
to gain insights into leadership selection. Specifically, the research examines why BCAP was
created, who started it, how and where it was implemented, and what the perspectives are of the
candidates that are evaluated using this process.
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III METHODS
III.1 Qualitative research.
The term qualitative refers to the nonnumerical description of a particular subject. This
methodology involves collecting and analyzing data concerning how people interpret their
involvement within the scope of the area of concern being researched (Trochim, et al. 2016).
Qualitative research is a method of understanding a social reality (Leavy 2014).
Qualitative measures are any measures where the data is recorded in a verbal format such
as interviews where video and audio data recording can be utilized in collecting impressions
(Trochim, et al. 2016).
A qualitative tradition describes the purpose of qualitative research including the role of
the researcher(s), the stages of research, and the method of data analysis. Figure 6 lays out four
of the major qualitative traditions (Trochim, et al. 2016). There are various methods for
conducting qualitative research, and for this paper I have chosen the case study approach in
researching BCAP.
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III.2 Building the Framework.

Figure 6 Traditions of Qualitative Research
(Trochim, et al. 2016)
III.3 Selecting the Case Study Approach.
Narrowing the focus to case study, the fundamental nature of the case study is to inform a
decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what
result. A case study is an empirical inquiry investigating a current phenomenon in complexity
involving a real-life situation. It involves areas where the investigator has little or no control
particularly when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clear. (Yin. 2018).
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Case study research in a business environment captures empirical evidence from actual
individuals in existing real-life companies (Myers. 2013). The matrix at Figure 7 shows the
various types of design to analyze contextual conditions in relation to the “case”.

Figure 7 Basic Types of Designs for Case Studies
(Yin. 2018)
Dotted lines are used to reflect the likely blurriness between the case and its context. The
matrix shows that single- and multiple-case studies show distinct design settings and within these
two variations there can be single or multiple units of analysis. The resulting four types of
designs for case studies are (Type 1) single-case (holistic) designs, (Type 2) single-case
(embedded) designs, (Type 3) multiple-case (holistic) designs, and (Type 4) multiple-case
(embedded) designs (Yin. 2018).
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A case study is an organizational method that allows for in-depth examinations of
multifaceted phenomena in their natural surroundings. The two most popular uses of case studies
in business schools are in teaching and in researching. Teaching case studies are created for
students, while research case studies are written principally for researchers (Yin. 2018). Case
study is further defined as an intensive study of a specific individual, event, organization, or
context (Trochim, et al. 2016).
Such a study consists of detailed investigation of one or more organizations, or groups
within organizations, with a view to providing an analysis of the context and processes involved
in the phenomenon studied (Meyer. 2001).
Case study research can be used both to build and to evaluate theory. Research cases are
employed as empirical evidence to persuade other researchers of the applicability (or
inapplicability) of a particular theory or proposition. The purpose of research cases is therefore to
contribute to knowledge in a particular field of study or research (Myers. 2013).
Ethnographic case studies derive from the field of social and cultural anthropology.
Placing the researcher in the experiences studied allows ethnographers to seek and apply their
findings into a social and cultural context. Social, organizational, and cultural aspects of
businesses have recently emerged as areas of interest by social science researchers (Myers.
2013). On the other hand, a case study researcher studies people, an ethnographer learns from
people (Spradley. 1980).
A single-case study is comparable to a single experiment when conditions justifying a
single experiment also justify a single-case study. The single case can symbolize a considerable
contribution to knowledge and theory building by confirming, challenging, or extending the
theory. These studies can change future studies in an entire area (Yin. 2018).
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A multiple case study design occurs when more than one case is used. In certain fields,
multiple-case studies are considered a different methodology from single-case studies. The
evidence collected is generally considered more compelling, creating a more robust study.
Conducting multiple-case studies requires massive resources and time beyond the means of a
single independent researcher. Therefore, the decision to commence a multiple-case study should
not be taken lightly. (Yin. 2018).
Many researchers prefer the single case study to identify new relationships (Dyer &
Wilkins. 1991), while others choose multiple cases for allowing comparisons along with
replicating in order to substantiate theoretical propositions (Eisenhardt. 1989). Overall, the
single-case method is defensible where the case represents (a) a critical test of existing theory,
(b) an extreme or unusual circumstance, or (c) a common case, or where the case serves a (d)
revelatory or (e) longitudinal purpose (Yin. 2018). Consequently, a single case method was
appropriate for this study, given that the goal was to explore the BCAP selection process in the
Army (a revelatory purpose), and the only comparison being made was with the legacy process,
and not across organizations.
An important caveat involving data collection in case studies involves ethical quandaries
of dealing with private information (Yin. 2018), and in my research participants were assured of
confidentiality.
I chose to conduct a case study utilizing a semi-structured approach beginning with a list
of specific questions beyond a binary yes/no response. This allowed participants to expand on
their response. Due to the impacts of the COVID-19 environment, I was forced to diversify my
preferred method of in-person interviews. I used a process involving actual in-person interviews
in a personal face-to-face setting, and sometimes a distance video technique involving Zoom or
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other like programs. Finally, when in-person interviews were impossible to accomplish, I used
questionnaires, which constrained my ability to adjust my questions based upon answers I was
receiving. The use of such mixed approaches is not without precedent (Samaddar & Kadiyala,
2006).
III.4 Researcher’s role as a Participant Observer.
Inductive qualitative inquiry in sociology was originally used by researchers who study
ethnography. By the 1940s, this methodology shifted from life histories and case studies to
participant observation (Charmez. 2014). Participant observation is seen as a complicated
method with many components. When considering the participant observer method of
conducting research, it is necessary to decide what kind of participant observer he or she will be.
Table 1 summarizes the five types (Spradley. 1980).
Table 1 Participant Observation Types
(Spradley. 1980)
Type
NonParticipatory
Passive
Participation
Moderate
Participation
Active
Participation
Complete
Participation

Level of Involvement
No contact with population or field of study
Researcher is only in the bystander role
Researcher maintains a balance between "insider" and "outsider" roles
Researcher becomes a member of the group by fully embracing skills
and customs for the sake of complete comprehension
Researcher is completely integrated in population of study beforehand
(i.e., they are already a member of particular population studied).

I consider myself a Moderate Participant in this research project. I conscientiously
maintained the delicate balance between ‘insider’ and ‘outsider roles, seeking an equilibrium for
achieving fairness.
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My insider knowledge of Army personnel management systems, developed during my
Army service from 1975-2007 provided me a deep understanding of how the promotion and
selection systems are designed and executed. Since retiring I maintain situational awareness of
many Army activities including deployed forces, weapons systems, and leadership initiatives and
activities.
I believe my personal experience enhances the research. Simultaneously, I am careful to
avoid allowing my knowledge to unduly influence my feelings. By recognizing my background
could possibly skew my conclusions, I carefully avoided asking any leading questions to mitigate
any bias when analyzing the data collected.
III.5 Data Collection Plan.
Using the strategy above, I delved deeper into the motivation driving the change in the
procedures and techniques in selecting battalion commanders. Table 1 shows the two phases
when and where the Battalion Command Assessment Program (BCAP) was implemented:
Table 2 Battalion Command Assessment Program Schedule
Date
Pilot BCAP
June-July 2019
Initial BCAP
January 12 – February 8, 2020

Location
Fort Benning, GA
Fort Knox, KY

The pilot BCAP was ‘proof of concept’ for validating the initial transformative processes
being developed. The initial BCAP was the full implementation of the transformed selection
methods developed after the pilot results.
III.5.1 Organizing the collection process.
To examine the vital criteria in selecting battalion commanders, I designed a strategy
using a single case study of Battalion Command Assessment Programs (BCAP). My case study
covers both events, the pilot from 2019 and the initial BCAP in 2020, using inductive techniques.
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III.5.2 Choosing research participants.
Choosing the right participants enables the researcher to answer the research question.
Gaining access to these participants is critical in gathering the data (Saunders. 2012).
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Table 3 Participants
Category
Senior Army leaders
BCAP Program management
Candidates in BCAP

Number of Participants
3
3
3

My research case study involved semi-structured interviews or questionnaires with a
sample size of nine (n=9). Although my sample size is not considered significantly significant, I
am able to reach some conclusions based upon the data I collected. Even though it is considered
anecdotal it is still relevant and powerful.
Table 2 shows the three categories I developed in my research protocols. These categories
cover the full spectrum of the stakeholders involved in BCAP from the senior Army leaders at
the national level down to the candidates themselves. In between is the group responsible for
developing the BCAP methodology and implementing BCAP.
The select group of nine Army officers and senior Army civilians possessed eight to forty
years’ military experience. All were male except for one candidate. Two participants listed
themselves as minorities.
The method I used in selecting participants began with discussing my research with a
retired Army Lieutenant General (3-star). He thought my subject was interesting and relevant
since BCAP was being fully implemented following the initial BCAP at Fort Benning. I asked
him to identify people he believed could provide me with meaningful data and might be willing
to talk with me. He gave me a couple of names and made introductions to a very senior Army
leader along with a senior Army civilian program manager.
At the same time, I leveraged my relationship with an old buddy who was personal
friends with the Army Vice Chief-of-Staff (a 4-star General). My buddy then introduced us and
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the “Vice” agreed there was merit to my research and endorsed my effort. Between these two
initial contacts, they provided me with an unofficial level of sponsorship which then opened the
door to my research.
In addition to interviewing these two senior leaders, I followed up on others they
suggested I talk to. Some were ready and willing to assist and speak to me, while others never
returned my phone calls or responded to my e-mails. Ultimately, I interviewed people with
relevant data who were ready, willing, and able to participate.
Although not entirely a random selection process, it provided enough opportunities to
talk with a satisfactory number of people from a cross-section of the three broad categories I
outlined in Table 3.
III.5.3 Developing survey questions.
An interview question must directly relate to the subject and be designed for producing
important and relevant knowledge regarding the topic in the interview. A good interview
question is one that directly contributes to knowledge creation (Brinkmann & Kvale. 2015).
Qualitative research questions normally focus on issue, and answers the who, what, when, where,
why, and how an event occurred along with the outcome (Rubin & Rubin, 2012).
In developing my questions, I extensively researched open sources of public, nonclassified, information. This included Department of the Army news releases and interviews. I
also found various new stories published in print or broadcast media, along with social media
posts. By reading, viewing, recording, and analyzing all of this information, I was able to
develop various questions to use. I developed my questions consistent with the areas where their
input would be most valuable. This enabled me to order, analyze and categorize their responses
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to maximize the information they provided. This method allowed me to reach various
conclusions adding to a very limited existing body of knowledge about BCAP.
III.6 Collecting the data.
Collecting data is an empirical undertaking for collecting information when you
analytically compare data points used in your decision making (Trochim, et al. 2016).
Some of the keys in collecting valuable data lies in various techniques. For example, tt is
important to ask good and relevant questions which allows for a fair interpretation. Have good
listening skills while avoiding existing beliefs or presumptions. Being adaptable to changing
situations and environments can be seen as openings rather than threats. Using exploratory
methods, it is very important to maintaining a solid grasp of the issues being examined. A
sensitivity to contradicting evidence is also important when conducting research in an ethical
approach (Yin. 2018).
My data collection was done individually with each participant, and randomly between
the three categories. I developed questionnaires (see Appendixes A-1 thru A-9) with specific
questions, some tightly structured while others were open-ended. The questions I developed were
directly relatable to the BCAP research that I previously completed, allowing me to focus on
what I considered the most important areas to study.
After completing an interview or receiving a completed questionnaire, I re-evaluated my
questions for relevancy to determine if I was acquiring rich and valuable data suitable for
appropriate interpretation. In many cases, I adjusted the questions I posed to future participants.
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III.7 Validity.
Validity refers to evaluating research (Leavy. 2014). Many scientifically oriented
researchers question the external validity of qualitative research due to fewer controls (Walle.
2015).
My approach involved a certain level of risk in validity of the data collected. One risk is
that the participants who were referred to me might be like-minded to the referring officials,
therefore perhaps sharing the same views and parroting their responses to my questions. I believe
this becomes an acceptable risk by me recognizing the potential of skewed data and mitigating
through my interpretive research lens for reducing potential bias.
III.8 Analysis.
A difference exists between data gathering and data analysis. The questions posed to
participants largely determines the answers received, so any analysis will impact the data and the
data will impact the analysis. It is overly simplistic to think of the analysis phase is separate from
the gathering phase. A qualitative researcher typically has an enormous amount of data and must
interpret it. One must transform data into something that is meaningful to you and your intended
audience. It is not enough simply to reduce the quantity of data; rather, the whole point is to
come up with some insights that help you and others to understand or explain the subject at hand.
(Myers. 2013). After conducting the interviews, I transcribed an enormous volume of data. Next,
I began looking for common themes and variations in what I heard along with the data collected
from the questionnaires, and then broke down the data into five frames to answer questions about
the BCAP initiative. Qualitative data does not permit statistical analysis, but lends itself to
logical generalizations (Samaddar & Kadiyala, 2006).
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IV RESULTS
In researching BCAP, I attempted to explain various aspects of this leadership selection
process utilizing the framework illustrated in Figure 8.

Figure 8 Framework for Understanding BCAP

Reporting the results is probably the most important part of a case study. The participants
should at least benefit in some way from the results. Equally important is the study sponsors or
champions feeling satisfied by the researcher effort (Klenke. 2016). Infographics are a visual
means for reporting results and communicating findings (Haenssgen, M. (2019).
My nine in-depth, semi-structured interviews and/or questionnaires yielded enormous
data providing the necessary information critical to my research effort. To make sense of the
amorphous data from the interviews, key points made by the interviewees are summarized in
Table 4 below, using the framework shown in Figure 8. The key data elements were then
associated with interpretations I made. These are elaborated on in the sections following the
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table.
Table 4 Results Summary
Frame
Key Data
Description
Why
•
Failing to complete
tenure
•
Toxic environment

Who

How

Where & when

Participant
Perspectives

•
Outdated process
•
Subjective analysis
•
Poor cognition
•
Lacking non-cognitive
values
•
Importance of
battalion command
•
Poor/limited data
•
Possible nepotism
•
Congress
•
Department of Army
•
Army G-1, Personnel
•
•
Centralized Selection
List
•
Army Talent
Management Task Force
(ATMTF)
•
BCAP Objectives
•
•
Pilot BCAP
•
Initial BCAP
•
Senior Leaders
•
Requires top officers
•
Unknown
effectiveness
•
Officers not ready for
command
Army BCAP Managers
•
Revising selection
methods
•
All-inclusive

Interpretation
•
Lacking needed traits
•
Bad attitude; poor
interpersonal skills
•
Poor selection methods
•
Limited criteria
•
Deficient capabilities
•
Poor communicator; lacks
motivation
•
Impacts the Army and
subordinate personnel
•
Weak outcomes
•
Affects morale
•
Provides oversight
•
Service responsibility
•
Directly responsible for
planning, executing, evaluating
•
•
Legacy (outdated) system
•
Temporary organization for
implementing change
•
Goals

•
•
•

Proof of principle testing
Full implementation

Senior Leaders
•
Smart, fit, open,
conscientious, extravert, agreeable,
tolerant
•
Lacks longitudinal analysis
•
Inability to accomplish
mission and/or taking care of
Soldiers
Army BCAP Managers
•
Lacked ability to identify
unprepared/ineffective officers
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assessment approach
•

Blind panel interview

•

BCAP Candidates
Relevant and effective

•

Available resources

•

Organizational culture

•

Self-awareness

•

Assessments

•
•

Data driven
Low female selection

•
Physical, communication,
cognitive, non-cognitive, 360
degree, and psychological
assessments
•
Mitigate bias, reduce
nepotism, provide fairness
BCAP Candidates
•
Too early to determine, more
comprehensive method
•
ATMTF website includes
wealth of information
•
Responsible for self—
fitness, communication skills,
creating positive culture for others
•
Deeper insight in innate
abilities
•
Determine if ready or not
ready for command
•
More objective outcomes
•
Requires explanation from
Army leadership

IV.1 Exploratory Frame 1: Why it was necessary to change.
“Battalion commanders are the seed corn for the Army’s future strategic leaders. They
are the leaders from which we select most future colonels and general officers. They will one day
lead the Army and make decisions that directly impact American national security. Battalion
commanders are arguably the most consequential leaders in the Army. Their experience,
placement, and influence give them an outsized ability to shape the future service of the soldiers
they lead. They train and develop our young soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and officers
and have more impact on their decisions to continue serving (or not) than any other leadership
position.”
Gen. James C. McConville, the 40th Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army
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According to a senior Army leader, change was needed to reduce the number of battalion
commanders failing to complete their two-year tenures. One of the primary factors in being
relieved of command involved toxic environments. Other examples were poor leadership traits
and behaviors, things like mistreating soldiers, showing favoritism, creating a hostile work
environment, and having unreasonable expectations. Sexual harassment, inappropriate
relationships with subordinates are also counterproductive or destructive leadership styles.
Data from my interviews mentioned selecting the correct person, at the right time, for
critical assignments, particularly battalion command. Prior to 1975 the Army’s procedures for
selecting battalion commanders involved a de-centralized system pushed down to the lowest
levels. This system for hiring subordinate commanders was vested exclusively in brigade and
division commanders. The weaknesses of the system was its fundamental lack of control and
potential for irregular usage throughout the Army.
Beginning in 1975 the Army implemented a centralized procedure, known as the
Centralized Selection List (CSL). Centralized selection brought consistency and transparency
when the Army badly needed both things.
Prior to BCAP, these two legacy processes of de-centralized and centralized selection
methods had been in use since World War II. Now imagining the Army without any type of
centralized selection process was difficult for many officers to comprehend.
IV.1.1 Why change.
Data collected showed that today it means transitioning from an industrial to an
information age environment.
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The Army’s traditional practices involves requiring officers to continually progress in
rank on specific timelines to remain in the army. Those failing to be selected for promotion
within these required timeframes are discharged.
Until recently when focusing on quantity not talents, the CSL system worked
satisfactorily as they had the necessary numbers where they can do an arbitrary 20% cut from
captain to major.
According to a program manager around year eleven of service the Army looks at
promoting officers to major. This is the first real selective cut. The bottom line is about 56% of
officers commissioned in a specific year group must be eliminated by years eleven and twelve.
IV.1.2 Personnel management processes.
One senior Army leader likened the Army’s current system being based on a 1947 model
of a mass-produced interchangeable one-size-fits-all officer corps. In 1980 the Army moved to a
rigid structure of year groups and established the up or out system forcing removal or retirement
of officers who are not selected for promotion. One new initiative involves grabbing subsets of
the officer population, running a pilot/prototype involving the new system of assigning activeduty officers called Army Talent Alignment Process (ATAP).
Another senior Army officer discussed the method used in managing most Army officers
today based on what your boss's boss thinks of you. It is a subjective analysis. The Army is
beginning to get a more comprehensive view of the officer while figuring out how they need to
be developed.
For officers lacking public speaking capabilities they must begin working on these skills
sooner. When they become a field grade officer (major to lieutenant colonel), and more senior
(colonel), the Army uses those characteristics for future assignments.
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A senior leader said that recently the Army began integrating a cognition test into the
captain’s career course (CCC) occurring during their fourth year. This begins identifying officers
cognitive and non-cognitive strengths and weaknesses.
IV.1.3 Talent Management.
We want to change talent management. Instead of managing people based on past
performance only, we want to give the hiring agency the ability to hire what seems to be that
average officer who has a unique knowledge skill and behavior that qualifies them for that job.
Army Program Manager.
Talent management encompasses acquiring, developing, employing, and retaining the
Army's greatest asset—the people. It enhances readiness by maximizing human potential.
According to one program manager the Army is moving out rapidly in four areas: first,
the Army talent alignment process matches officers to assignments. Second, building a culture of
assessments to identify an officer's knowledge, skills, and behaviors. Third, developing options
that enable officers to have flexible career paths. Lastly, modernizing methods in selecting and
promoting officers.
Another program manager mentioned transforming the battalion command selection
process to identify the CSL deficiencies. He said they were lacking methods in collecting and
sorting any sort of rigorous data for determining who were the most capable to serve as battalion
commanders.
It was all a very subjective evaluation from a senior rater, so the Army began moving to
more objective information and data. The existing system lacked ways to determine the most
effective leaders. They used subjective information about a paragraph long written by the
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officer’s bosses’ boss (senior rater). About the length of a standard Tweet. This is what Boards
were using in determining the officers being selected, said the program manager.
IV.1.4 The significance of the battalion commander leadership level in the Army structure.
The Army considers battalion command to be the most consequential leadership position
in the Army for two reasons, according to a senior officer. First, leaders in these positions have
the ability to directly impact and shape the experience of younger officers and noncommissioned officers during their formative years. Second, they have a more comprehensive
understanding of the direction of the Army as a whole.
A senior leader mentioned that what makes battalion command so important, it is one of
the ways to make significant cuts within the ranks of the officer corps. This process also
identifies who makes colonel and general officer. The more relevant the information being made
available enables making better decisions.
Battalion commanders typically have 15-17 years of service, leading formations averaging
three to five companies of between 3,000 to 5,000 Soldiers. Figure 9 provides an illustration
depicting ranks associated with the various levels of command. It ranges from a squad of about
10 Soldiers all the way up to a Field Army with as many as 100,000 Soldiers.
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Source: U.S. Department of the Army

Figure 9 Army Command Levels by Rank

IV.1.5 The Centralized Selection List (CSL).
This legacy system was utilized for nearly five decades in selecting battalion
commanders. According to one senior leader the time was ripe in transforming the procedures in
choosing the top officers to command Army battalion and brigade level units.
The CSL system was designed for ensuring fairness and meritocracy in choosing leaders.
With more and better data becoming available through automated data systems senior leaders are
better enabled for making better decisions.
According to a senior Army leader, the CSL process had panel members reviewing a file
in under two minutes. They scrutinized a current full-length photo for compliance with height-
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weight standards followed by reviewing the officer record brief (ORB), a CV like document,
showing education levels, duty assignments, deployments, etc.
Next was reviewing the most recent officer evaluation reports (OERs) by looking at the
senior rater’s assessment of where the rated officer ranks among their peers holding the same
rank. Last was reading only the first and last sentences of the senior rater’s narrative paragraph in
terms of promotion potential.
IV.1.6 Battalion Command Assessment Program (BCAP).
According to one senior leader “creating BCAP enhances the Army’s selection of
battalion commanders”.
Initially a pilot BCAP was designed by adding new components instead of completely
overhauling the CSL.
During one interview, a senior leader discussed the pilot program. It added an on-site
five-day period, whereas the CSL did not involve any face-to-face contact between board
members and candidates. BCAP added a series of in-person assessments including testing
physical fitness and evaluating public speaking and writing skills. A battery of cognitive and
non-cognitive tests involving their abilities was also implemented. When I asked about data
collection and psychological assessments in BCAP, a program manager described the panels
having collected additional data from the psychologists.
He said this is not about condemning the CSL process, rather its more about process
improvement for enhancing the outcomes. BCAP marks a fundamental shift in the way the Army
is selecting its battalion commanders.
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A senior leader told me that before BCAP, the Army was placing more rigor into
selecting privates into special forces than they were in selecting leaders of battalions and
brigades.
IV.1.7 Other considerations.
Data showed one concern was nepotism and diversity. Nepotism was happening in the
CSL which lacked mechanisms in routinely and systematically checking against it. The Army
BCAP program managers began trying to figure out how to accomplish reducing potential
nepotism and whether this is something they should or could be regulating.
The Army program managers decided for the pilot BCAP to try illuminating this area
because trying to define nepotism is tricky. An example he gave was how many times Captain X
could work for Colonel Y before it's nepotism. Should brigade commanders be able to hire
maybe three people out of forty that previously worked for him or her before, or is it five people?
It was an area lacking regulatory guidance in Department of Defense (DoD) instructions as well
as Army regulations.
This one area of diversity Army program managers are keeping an eye on is making sure
leaders are not hiring people who just look like themselves.
IV.2 Exploratory Frame 2: The organizations involved in changing the process.
In order to provide context for this section, I review roles and responsibilities beginning
at the national level and going down. Starting with the three branches of government and their
ultimate impact on the outcomes of creating BCAP. This section also briefly discusses the
organizations creating and implementing BCAP.
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IV.2.1 Congress.
The basis in law for the establishing the United States Armed Forces originates from the
United States Constitution in Article 1 Section 8 The Congress shall have Power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence (sic) and general Welfare of the United States, and in Article 2 Section 2 The President
shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the
several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States. (United States
Constitution. 1789).
Congress exercises its’ constitutional authority through standing committees and subcommittees involving the Armed Forces. In August 1956, Congress enacted legislation called
‘Title 10 of the United States Code’ which covers the armed forces, and provides the legal basis
for the roles, missions, and organization of each of the services as well as the United States
Department of Defense (Title 10, U.S.C.). See Figure 10.
The President performs his executive duties as Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Armed
Forces the Department of Defense.

Figure 10 Legal Authorities
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IV.2.2 Department of Defense.
The Department of Defense (DoD) is organized by military service as depicted in Figure
11. Civilian control of the military is a cornerstone of our democracy, and therefore is reflected
in how our armed forces are organized. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is the principle military
advisor to the President, and reports to the Secretary of Defense for the appropriate civilian
oversight. Each military department has civilian oversight vested in a service secretary, while the
service chief runs the day-to-day activities.

Figure 11 Chain of Command

IV.2.3 Department of the Army.
The Secretary of the Army has overall responsibility for the U.S. Army and exercises
authority over the Army Chief of Staff. Further down the chain of command, deputy secretaries
provide oversight for their particular area of responsibility, such as personnel, intelligence,
operations, logistics, etc., and oversee the deputy chiefs of staff for those areas of similar
responsibility. (Title 10. U.S.C.). Figure 12 reflects how the Army Staff is organized.
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Figure 12 Army Staff Organizational Chart

IV.2.4 Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1 (Personnel).
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army, United States Army,
also known as the G-1 is responsible for development, management and execution of all
manpower and personnel plans, programs and policies throughout the entire U.S. Army.
IV.3 Exploratory Frame 3: How changes were developed and implemented.
Army leadership needed changes in both the process and personnel involved in
transforming from the CSL to BCAP. Utilizing a talent management approach, they wanted to
maximize the potential of the Army's greatest strengths—its people.
One of the big ideas the Army had was creating an organization under the direction of the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, a three-star Lieutenant General. They created a new
organization responsible for improving and managing personnel processes named the Army
Talent Management Task Force (ATMTF) as shown in Figure 13.
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Figure 13 Army G-1 with ATMTF

IV.3.1 The Army Talent Management Task Force (ATMTF).
The Army founded the Army Talent Management Task Force (ATMTF) in 2016. It was
this idea that I heard about for transforming the battalion command selection process.
Army senior leaders told me some of the ways to do that came from guidance from the
Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff. It was not to take the current system and
make it better on the borders, it was creating a new and dynamic system.
An ‘anonymized’ version of the ATMTF organizational chart in effect on October 26,
2020, is depicted in Figure 14. It illustrates how the ATMTF was organized and staffed,
including the military ranks for the various positions with some positions designated for
Department of the Army (DA) civilian personnel. This chart further depicts the roles and
missions within the ATMTF to help better understand the capabilities available to fulfill their
responsibilities.
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(source: Department of the Army, Office of Talent Management Task Force)

Figure 14 Army Talent Management Task Force Organizational Structure

IV.3.2 Battalion Command Assessment Program (BCAP) objectives.
One of the program managers explained to me BCAP is triangulating and bringing all
this other relevant information together in making these important decisions. Before making a
critical decision, they must know two points of information—information they get through
cognitive and non-cognitive assessments along with some screening done by psychologists.
The CSL process relied heavily on the senior rater insight, which is fundamentally the
performance evaluation written by the rated officer’s boss’s boss. The transformed process began
including peer and subordinate insights, and an impartial set of completed cognitive and noncognitive assessments providing a much better idea of who is the best candidate.
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IV.4 Exploratory Frame 4: Where changes were implemented.
To evaluate the changes being proposed by BCAP, the Army needed to a ‘proof of
principle’ approach. Their chosen method was conducting a pilot program in a very controlled
environment. Afterwards they began analyzing and evaluating the data, while identifying
improvements before full scale implementation would occur.
IV.4.1 Pilot program in evaluating the BCAP concept.
One program manager explained to me the Army conducted a pilot BCAP in the summer
of 2019 using the results of that year’s Battalion Command Selection Board. That Board had
utilized the CSL process.
Consistent with the desired goal of a limited approach, only officers in armor and infantry
branches were being considered. This involved 23 officers from the CSL’s primary selection list
for battalion command. An additional four officers from the alternate selection list were added.
Another officer had already been assigned to battalion command and was therefore removed
from participating in the pilot BCAP, leaving 26 officers for consideration according to a
program manager.
Three of the 26 officers selected for the pilot BCAP opted out, no longer desiring
consideration for battalion command. I was unable to get an explanation for why those three
opted out.
A four-officer control group was identified by selecting from those ranked in the top 10%
of the primary centralized selection list (CSL). The remaining 23 officers participating were
evaluated through the methods previously discussed and concluding with individual blind
interviews conducted by a panel involving a group of former brigade commanders and a
psychologist.
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Program managers had the Army Human Resources Command (HRC) distribute the
Army commander evaluation tool questionnaire to the candidates’ peers and subordinates. This
360-degree assessment could be completed in about 10 minutes. They answered questions about
the individuals’ leadership style, and if they would recommend this person to be a battalion
commander. About 95% of the comments were positive to neutral with very few cases with
negative comments according to the data I collected.
After compiling the results, there were significant changes to the original order of merit
list (OML) that was in place from the legacy CSL process. Notable changes are shown in Table 5
provided to me by program managers:

Table 5 Pilot BCAP Results
23 Officers were evaluated during Pilot BCAP
Change in position on Order of Merit List (OML)
Average movement up or down
Lowest ranked officer (alternate) moving up on list
Number determined ‘Not Ready for Command’ or requested
to be removed from consideration for battalion command

Results
35%
8 positions
From 23rd to 1st
8 officers (30%)

Of the eight officers determined ‘not ready for command’, two failed for exceeding
height-weight (maximum allowable standards).
IV.4.2 Implementing an initial BCAP.
According to one Army leader, the Army Chief of Staff was extremely excited by the
results from the pilot testing. He then directed implementing BCAP for the next iteration
involving the Fiscal Year 2021 (FY21) battalion command list. According to a program
manager, the ATMTF conducted the initial BCAP in January and February 2020 at Fort Knox,
Kentucky.
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Source: U.S. Army Preparation Guide for BCAP and CCAP Version 1.0 August 2020

Figure 15 Initial BCAP Results
The chart shown as Figure 15, captures key information about the initial BCAP. It
illustrates the transformation process from the legacy system to BCAP, and then integrating the
two methods creating a new battalion command selection list. Additionally, the chart provides
the raw statistics of those identified for participation, while outlining each step in the process.
IV.5 Exploratory Frame 5: Stakeholders perspectives of BCAP.
This frame captures feedback from the various perspectives of everyone involved with
BCAP. A program manager told me it is a critical part in ensuring the lessons learned are
incorporated in future iterations of BCAP. According to a senior leader, listening to the voices of
the personnel across the full spectrum is very important in making BCAP a world-class talent
management process of identifying and selecting leaders.
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IV.5.1 Army Senior Leaders.
"We want the absolute best leaders in place because parents are going to send their sons
and daughters to serve in the Army, and we want to make sure they are taken care of and are
treated with dignity and respect and they have the opportunity to excel in the Army—that's a
function of leadership."
Gen. James C. McConville, the 40th Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army
Interviewer: Since testing the concept, some Army senior leaders are not totally
convinced they can expect similar outcomes consistent with the Pilot and Initial BCAP results?
Senior leader: The truth is we do not know [the impact BCAP will have]. But we do know
we should have commanders who can pass the PT [physical fitness] test and meet height and
weight standards. We should have commanders who are deployable, can lead without being
toxic, and have the mental faculties to be successful in command. And we know that the current
centralized selection list [CSL] system on its own is not getting us there.

Interviewer: How about the senior Army Leaders, did you get feedback from them as
well?
Senior leader: From data collected, more than 144 senior Army officers and NCOs had a
front row seat on the double-blind panels for learning about the candidates. They heard directly
from candidates about the challenges facing leaders at the battalion and brigade staff levels and
the unique ways candidates overcame those challenges. Senior leaders expressed an
appreciation for the opportunity to hear from candidates about experiences and situations the
leaders may have forgotten.

Interviewer: What are some of the reasons officers failed the assessment?
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Senior leader: Officers who failed the assessment did so for a range of reasons. Some
were unable to pass the physical fitness test or height and weight. Others demonstrated
indicators of toxic behavior or lacked cognitive ability deemed necessary for command.
Four officers from the alternate list outperformed four officers on the previous battalion
command selection list as primary selectees. This dramatically changed the results of the final
list for battalion command.

Interviewer: When did you conduct the first BCAP?
Senior leader: The first cohort of 45 officers began arriving on January 15, 2020, to start
the first of their five-day program. By February 9, 2020, about 750 officers had gone through the
program at Fort Knox, KY.

Interviewer: Did you have specific goals for BCAP?
Senior leader: We had three specific goals for BCAP: professional, consistent and fair.
We wanted BCAP cadre focusing on every candidate having an identical experience, whether
they were in cohort one or cohort eighteen.
Equally important was making certain every iteration of the Army Comprehensive Talent
Interview (ACTI) included a panel moderator whose job it was ensuring standardization across
all panel operations. Leaders were also insisting all Cadre, including psychologists and panel
moderators, were operating from a script to ensure consistency for each and every candidate.

Interviewer: Is there anything else you would like to add?
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Senior leader: General McConville, Chief of staff of the Army, spent three years as the
Army G-1 (Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel) and two years as the Vice-Chief of Staff of the
Army. It is highly unusual for the Army to be led by someone who understands the people side of
the Army better than General McConville.
IV.5.2 Army BCAP Managers.
With battalion commanders serving in critical roles in the Army, the program managers
were responsible in making efforts for ensuring only the best were selected for this
extraordinarily important position. The following paragraphs captures key data from interviews I
conducted.

Interviewer: What were the reasons for revising the selection process for battalion
commanders?
Program manager: Some of the initial effects was in identifying those officers with
tendencies for potentially being counterproductive and eliminating them from consideration. It
also began allowing for candidates who were very talented in the range of the desired
attributes…and had not been identified by the legacy system. Lastly, looking for leaders who
embody the Army values of loyalty, duty, respect, honesty, etc. in creating conditions for their
units to succeed by incorporating superior ways in communicating with their superiors, peers
and subordinates alike

Interviewer: Are you aware of the Army proof of concept conducted in June and July
2019?
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Program Manager: In June and July 2019, the Army conducted the pilot Battalion
Commander Assessment Program (BCAP). Participants included infantry and armor officers on
the battalion command primary and alternate centralized selection list (CSL).

Interviewer: Can you describe a little bit about the BCAP process?
Army program manager: By taking an all-inclusive approach in reviewing the new data
provided from this sequence of assessments—physical, cognitive and non-cognitive assessments,
insight from peers, subordinates, and psychologists, as well as personal observations of the
candidate's performance during the interview—each panel member determined if the candidate
was ready for command or not ready for command.

Interviewer: Can you describe some of the assessment areas?
Program manager: These candidates were analyzed through a regimen of assessments,
beginning with a height-weight test and Army physical fitness test. Candidates took two tests to
determine their written communication skills. Additionally, these officers worked through a
leader reaction course with their peers and conducted an interview with a psychologist trained
in assessments and selections. Next, officers took a series of cognitive and non-cognitive
assessments in measuring multiple forms of cognitive capability.

Interviewer: I understand it also included a panel interview. Can you speak to that?
Program manager: The culminating event of the pilot was a blind panel interview…the
panel members cannot see the officer, and the officer is unable to identify the panel members.
Prior to interviewing the candidate, a psychologist provided standardized insights on the
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candidate's strengths and weaknesses. The members proceeded to ask a series of standardized
behavioral-based questions to gain additional insights.
The panelists were given information about each participant’s assessment and
performance during the week, as well as the peer and subordinate feedback. They were
intentionally not given any personally identifiable information about the participants.
Participants were instructed to do their best not to share any information that would identify
them.
Several recent company commanders and command sergeants major did sit in on each
interview…and shared what they thought it would be like working for that candidate if he was a
battalion commander.
During the first portion the panel asked the participants the same series of structured
questions. For the second portion the panel asked questions to explore the candidate’s specific
strengths or potential risks. After receiving feedback from the recent company commanders and
command sergeants major, each panel member individually submitted an evaluation, including a
determination of the candidate’s readiness for command, or lack thereof.
Following the panel interview and the cumulative scoring of the assessments, the
participants were ranked in order-of-merit, by branch.

Interviewer: What can you tell me about the [interview] results?
Program manager: While several participants were very fit, other participants failed
either the height and weight test or the physical fitness test. Most exhibited great collaboration
skills and a capacity to motivate, while others showed the possibility for counterproductive
leadership. Some officers presented signs of being stifling workaholics or excessively passive,
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while most showed they were extremely considerate officers. Unsurprisingly, a small number of
participants were identified who should not command at the battalion level.

Interviewer: What were some of the risks and challenges?
Program manager: Some of the dangers and questions impacting the BCAPs success or
failure relies on the legitimacy of the information. Accurately identifying mandatory knowledge,
skills and behaviors needed for successful battalion command also requires designing
assessments for reliably validating them.
Testing the participants for character is very challenging. BCAP’s biggest opening into
an applicant's personality is coming from peer and subordinate assessments. Ensuring
candidates are evaluated accurately and without any unfair advantage is always a challenge
particularly if the process disadvantages any demographic group. Personnel from historically
underrepresented ethnic and minority groups must feel confident that they are receiving a fair
and balanced evaluation.
One of the remaining challenges is in the overall cost-benefit analysis of fully
implementing BCAP when compared to CSL. A slight reordering of the battalion command list
may not be worth the resource costs, although eliminating counterproductive and underqualified
leaders can reap huge benefits.

Interviewer: In your opinion, what is the importance of getting it right?
Program manager: Because leadership drives organizational triumph, the Army must
guarantee the Army’s senior leaders are the absolute best. Officers being selected must be
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critical thinkers. The preponderance of general officers successfully completed all prior
assignments, and most importantly were former battalion commanders.
Program manager: Some toxic leaders were still slipping through the gaps of the legacy
process. There is anecdotal evidence where certain outstanding officers were not selected,
sometimes resulting from personality conflicts with a boss, and even the boss’s boss, reflected in
their performance reports. Since selection boards are made up by humans, there was an obvious
risk of biases being interjected into the selection process.
Program manager: The ATMTF desired using industry best practices from within the
military and government, while also looking at civilian enterprises. They carefully cooperated
with other Army organizations including the Army research labs, the Army special forces
community, along with organizations inside the Army War College, the US Military Academy,
and the Human Resources Command (HRC).

Interviewer: Anything else you are willing and able to share?
Program manager: Anecdotally, program managers, and personnel officers from HRC,
are receiving substantial feedback about how this is driving conversations that haven't
previously materialized. A lot of HRC messaging is from officers trying to understand how this
whole system works.
Program manager: After concluding the pilot BCAP, a group of generals decided to meet
with each participant individually for providing feedback in order to create a mentoring
environment. Specifically, they discussed three of the candidate’s leadership strengths and three
weaknesses. Using this developmental lens, these discussions occurred in a manner intended to
place the participant at ease in order to maximize the session in a collegial environment.
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Program manager: After the BCAP results are announced, the Army need’s to support
and encourage those officers identified as alternates. As could be expected, some of the
alternates did not appreciate the news, while others were discouraged and perhaps even angry.
Army leaders must make serious efforts in recognizing both groups and develop ways to handle
both the jubilation as well as the disappointments.
IV.5.3 Army BCAP Candidates. T
he officers attending the initial BCAP conducted in January-February 2020
overwhelmingly said it was one of the best run Army programs they have ever attended. They
cited the professionalism of the cadre, the consistency and fairness throughout 18 different
cohorts, and the level of detail that went into every aspect of their five-day experience. They
provided an extensive amount of feedback, some of which follows.

Interviewer: Do you think BCAP is relevant and potentially effective?
Candidate 3: I know several female Army officers who will be eligible to compete for
Battalion Command in the next five years. Some are married and raising kids. The Army has
made a lot of positive changes to its talent management systems over the past two decades. In
2013, the military lifted a ban previously preventing females from serving in combat roles,
although women had already been serving in combat for years in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2015,
women were allowed to attend Ranger School for the first time, a key discriminator in operations
branches. Perhaps most significantly, in 2016 women began to integrate into combat arms units
such as the Infantry and Combat Engineers where they were previously not allowed to serve.
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Candidate 2: Absolutely since BCAP is the Army’s effort to determine if an officer is fit
for command and strategic leadership positions. During my rotation I noted three themes that
stood out to me: resources currently available, organizational culture, and self-awareness.

Interviewer: Lets drill down on these themes one at a time beginning resources.
Candidate #2: There is a wealth of resources for incoming candidates at The ATMTF
website. The website includes: a welcome brief; candidate guide; relevant news articles; and an
introduction to the Army Comprehensive Talent Interview panel. I found these very helpful to me
in explaining the process and useful in preparing for BCAP. They created transparent processes,
so each officer has an opportunity to succeed and present themselves in the best possible light.

Interviewer: How about the next theme of organizational culture?
Candidate 2: I was the one attending so I was the one responsible for my performance.
However, as I progressed through the five-day assessment, I refocused my attention to the
opportunities for leaders to develop their people and enhance their organization. For example,
while being assessed on my own communication acumen, I questioned how well I had prepared
my subordinates in their communication skills. I stopped thinking about myself and started
thinking about how I can create a unit culture that encourages continuous development.
I realized that all the assessments at BCAP, whether physical fitness, communication
skills, or cognitive ability, were testing against standards that had been spelled out throughout
my career. I knew my ability to meet those standards, but had I done enough to ensure others
could as well?
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Interviewer: Lastly, can you expand on the last theme of self-awareness?
Candidate 2: BCAP offers a unique opportunity to gain deeper insight into each
candidate. While the information from the session with the operational psychologist is used by
the panel, I found the final out brief a priceless opportunity to gain new insight into my own
character. The psychologist explained how my dominant characteristics might influence my
leadership abilities. This candid and dynamic feedback helped me appreciate where my actions
may not align with my self-image, and how a misalignment may have unintended consequences.
As I reflected on my results from both the psychometric testing and out brief with the
psychologist, I thought deeply about the type of command [tactical; installation; recruiting] I
might be best suited to. The BCAP process as a whole shifted my thinking and will undoubtedly
help me prepare for any future assignment by exploiting my strengths and improving my
weaknesses.

Interviewer: I understand that you participated in one of the first iterations of BCAP. Can
you provide some context about your participation?
Candidate 1: My performance there will likely determine if I will continue to progress in
the United States Army. Each of us who participated have provided significantly more data to the
Army in order to deem us either ready or not ready for battalion command. The stakes are high
for officers; many of them feel that selection for battalion command is the defining achievement
of a career as an Army officer. With the institution of BCAP, the rules for reaching that goal
seem to have changed suddenly, frustrating and angering many of those invested in the current
system. Many of my peers find themselves questioning if their efforts over the last 16–18 years
still mean anything.
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Interviewer: Anything about the various assessments?
Candidate 1: The final event received the most attention due to its novel use of a “blind”
panel. Initially, this format concerned me because it seemed to eliminate the evaluation of
criteria I thought was important for battalion command—presence, professional appearance,
and use of nonverbal communication. However, we were told that the blind interview had two
specific objectives: (1) to determine if an officer was ready for command; and (2) to assess the
verbal communication skills of the officer. Given those limited objectives, the blind setup made
sense.
The panel’s first objective was a pass-fail determination. It only had to determine if a
candidate exhibited characteristics that convinced a majority of the panel members that he or
she was/was not ready to command a battalion. I was not privy to the exact criteria, but I
suspected some indicators—like toxic leadership traits, for example—might have met that
threshold.

The second objective—assessing verbal skills—didn’t require the panel to see the officer.
Panel members just needed to hear what that officer was saying and assess how effectively he or
she communicated according to a rubric shared with candidates before our arrival at Fort Knox.
Overall, the quality that most clearly characterized all of the events conducted was
consistency. Data collected from these events will make the process of selecting battalion
commanders fairer because it allows for a more even comparison between officers with a wide
variety of backgrounds. All data was collected the same way, for each and every officer under
consideration.
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Interviewer: Do you have any other thoughts about the process?
Candidate 1: Accepting that data-driven decisions have a role in our modern Army is a
step in the right direction. It is a demonstration of trust in a selection methodology that carves
out a space for data analysis. The human element still plays the biggest role in deciding if and
where an officer will command a battalion. Assessment of past performance makes up the
greatest share of the formula. The important thing is that the Army is bringing in data analysis
where previously there was none.
What struck me several days after I returned from the BCAP was—how do we know we
are collecting the right data? Do soldiers of higher cognitive ability actually make better
commanders? Can we say the same of APFT scores? The BCAP collected comprehensive data
on a single year group—a single data pull at one point in time from a particular year group of
officers. The Army doesn’t have a way to take these results and compare them against
historically successful commanders.
Other than collective assumptions about desirable characteristics in a commander, we
don’t know for sure which have a causal relationship with mission success or to what degree.

Interviewer: I understand that you reviewed the results of the 2020 Battalion Command
selections. What are some of your observations regarding those selected?
Candidate 3: I have a personal stake in learning why so few women were selected. When
the Army announced its next generation of battalion commanders, the number of women selected
is concerning. A snapshot of Operations Division branches (formally known as combat arms)
highlights the disparity (see Table 5). This is alarming because women represent just 8% of the
selected population in these five branches, a drop from 15% two years ago.
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Table 6 Fiscal Year 2020 Battalion Command Selection Results
Career Field
#Selected
#
% Females
Female
selected
Engineer
31
1
3%
Aviation
42
3
7%
Military Police
15
2
13%
Chemical
5
2
40%
Air Defense
11
0
0%
Artillery
Source: Anonymous

Interviewer: Can you describe your thoughts about the selection rate for females?
Candidate 3: Battalion command is a pivotal milestone in any Army officer’s career, and
an important step on the path to becoming a general officer. Why were so few women selected in
2020? Is 2020 an exception, or part of a broader trend? Most importantly, what signal do these
numbers send about the chances of career advancement to junior female officers? I believe
women from across the Army will initially view these numbers with concern and will want an
explanation.

Interviewer: Do you think there are any inherent biases in the BCAP process?
Candidate 3: There are multiple steps in the BCAP where bias may have influenced a
candidate’s ranking. Over four days, candidates go through a series of physical and nonphysical assessments, subordinate and peer feedback is reviewed, and they attend a blind panel
interview. How were biases controlled for at each of these gates? My initial research suggests
the BCAP deliberately sought to mitigate gender (and other) biases throughout the process; the
pertinent question is whether these efforts were successful.
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V

DISCUSSION

V.1 Improvements in Leader Selection.
Several key issues were identified in the leadership selection process (CSL) that was used
before BCAP, and the outcomes it created. The CSL process was prone to several biases in the
selection process. Specifically, the files that decision makers used on the candidates had some
minimal information regarding height and weight, and a paragraph of subjective assessment by a
unit leader, along with a ranking within his or her unit. The evaluators would then spend roughly
2 minutes on each candidate’s file before making a decision. Several problems are evident in this
system. First, there are no clear criteria defined. There is no systematic data collection on the
candidates to permit future analysis that can tie the characteristics used to promote a candidate
with subsequent behaviors and outcomes as a leader. The subjective rating by a unit leader
opened the door for several possible unconscious biases, as well as outright nepotism or
favoritism. There was also little accountability for the decisions made, since no clear connections
could be drawn between the data and future performance. In terms of the outcomes, it was clear
to the top levels of the army leadership that this process put in place some people in leadership
positions that clearly did not belong there, displaying toxic behaviors and other transgressions
that required them to be censured or terminated later.
Did the BCAP process solve all the issues? It is difficult to claim unequivocally that
BCAP is the solution to all of the problems, but it is clear in the design of the BCAP that there is
a conscious effort to reduce, if not eliminate many of these problems with leader selection in the
army. First, a four-day rigorous testing of the candidates as opposed to a 2-minute review of a
file indicates that there is a serious effort underway to identify the right candidates using
consistent and fair criteria, rather than a series of subjective assessments. The tests involved
physical fitness, cognitive ability, psychological testing, and communication skills. Some of the
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tests were conducted blind, with a screen between the testers and candidates to avoid certain
types of bias. The psychometric testing not only evaluated the candidates’ psychological profiles
for the decision makers, but also served to provide feedback to the candidates themselves in
terms of their strengths and weaknesses, and the types of command that they may be most
suitable for.
One possible criticism of the BCAP is that even if all these tests are conducted fairly, it is
not clear whether certain psychological attributes or cognitive abilities are the best indicators of
leadership potential. While this may be true, the systematic collection of this data will serve the
army well in the future as they assess the outcomes of this process in terms of leader
effectiveness, and tie those outcomes back to the data at the time of selection.
The longer-term question, of course, is whether the Battalion Command Assessment
Program (BCAP) leader selection process resulted in improved outcomes. It is too early in the
process to make any evidence and data-based conclusions. The effects of leadership will take at
least a year or two or longer to manifest themselves, and this will be an ongoing effort for the
army to collect and analyze data.
A number of steps are necessary in order to answer the overarching question if the Army
selected the right leaders. The first step is monitoring the battalion commanders’ performance
during their tenures, normally lasting two years. Next is collecting and recording data on those
not completing their tenures and why. In the meantime, they must collect archival data from
prior years containing sufficient variables to establish baselines.
Officers selected during the Initial BCAP take command during FY2021 (October 1,
2020, to September 30, 2021). Approximately 80% of the changes of command occur during the
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2021 summer months of June, July and August. Consequently, this cohort of battalion
commanders will not complete their assigned tenures until as late as September 30, 2023.
After the ATMTF completes a comprehensive longitudinal data collection they can begin
their analysis. Fortunately, the Army has a group of officers called operational research and
systems analysts (ORSA). The Army Research Institute utilizes these highly qualified ORSA
researchers in these types of cases.
V.2 Contributions of the study.
This study contributes to the understanding of leadership selection processes in general,
using the army as a case, highlighting the need for systematic evaluation of candidates based on
clearly laid out criteria, rather than an ad hoc, subjective approach that leaves the door open to
various biases.
Creating articles in professional military periodicals and journals along with civilian
business, management, and perhaps behavioral psychological publications will add to the
existing body of knowledge. The BCAP process including information contained in the
framework of this paper adds value too. The data, findings, results, and outcomes will assist the
U.S. Army Human Resources Command talent managers in educating the Army officer corps on
competing for battalion command.
V.3 Limitations
The most obvious and recognizable limitation to this research study is that the BCAP
process is in its early stages of implementation, which means that long term effects on leadership
behaviors and outcomes are as yet unknown. Initial reports and anecdotes are encouraging, as is
an evaluation of the selection process itself.
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Another limitation is the constraints of being a single researcher. A larger research team
may help in collecting, reviewing, analyzing, and reaching evidence-based conclusions on the
enormous volume of data involved as the BCAP program grows.
Other limiting factors involve dealing with the Army Research Institute, because they
seem to be less helpful to researchers outside of the Department of Defense (DoD). Their
reluctance to respond to inquiries, along with their disinclination to assist researchers outside of
DoD is makes the task more difficult for an outside researcher.
V.4 Future Research
I believe there are several opportunities for additional research, the first being sometime
after September 30, 2023. Obtaining useful data on battalion commanders—those who
successfully completed their tenure, and those who didn’t. A few categories of not completing
their tenure could include reasons such as relief from command for toxic behavior, misconduct
or inappropriate relationships, or those who lost the trust and confidence in their ability to lead as
determined by the superiors.
Once the performance data is obtained, it can be correlated to the selection criteria used
to promote them in the first place. Using a data driven approach looking for correlations by
comparing their characteristics with their performance would help fine tune the selection process
over time, and get greater clarity on the characteristics that are the most important identifiers of
effective leadership behavior.
Finally, there is scope for
research involving the selection rate for females and other underrepresented groups and
their selection rates, along with their rates of success in completing battalion command tenures.
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APPENDIX: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL
Dissertation Research
Joseph M. Williams
Georgia State University
Participant #
Interviewer Name: Joe
Williams Date of Interview:
Time Interview
Started: Time
Interview Concluded:
Location of Interview:
Length of Service:
Length of Time in the Army:
Rank or Civilian Grade:
Assignment:
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Instructions: The interviewer will ask the numbered interview questions and at his
discretion, the interviewer will probe to elicit data-rich, narrative responses. As a semistructured interview, the interviewer may ask additional follow-up questions beyond this
protocol in order to clarify the participant’s response or probe further into the qualitative
data provided in the open-ended responses.

Note that special instructions are in italics and should not be read aloud. The
interviews are audio-recorded, in order for the interviewer to later analyze the
verbatim interview responses. Throughout the course of the interview, the interviewer
should record, in writing, nonverbal communication as it is observed or immediately
following the interview.

For the interviewees unable to participate in in-person interviews, I am providing
written questionnaires to be completed at the convenience of the interviewee. In most
cases, these questionnaires required some follow-up to illicit additional information, or
to clarify information they provided.
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Basic Instructions
Thank you in advance for meeting with me today and participating in this research
study. My research involves transforming the Army’s leader selection process, and more
specifically the new battalion command assessment program (BCAP). I will ask you broad
questions involving your thoughts on how the Army may have selected leaders in the past,
including battalion leaders, and then get more specific with questions about your roles in
this new transformed process of BCAP. Do you have any questions about it or the study in
general before we get started?
I appreciate the time you’ve agreed to commit,-- and for those participating in an
in-person interview-- I’ll set a timer to ensure we do not exceed the agreed-upon 60
minutes. As mentioned in the informed consent, I will be recording this interview so that
I may have a verbatim transcript and capture everything accurately. Is this still ok with
you?
The interviewer should ensure the participant gives a clear response.
As detailed in the informed consent form, the transcript will not contain any
information that could identify you, and your comments will be assigned a randomly
generated code, such as “Participant #XX.”

I am the lone investigator on this study project and commit to preserving
confidentiality for you and all other participants. In the interest of confidentiality for you
and all those involved and not involved in this study, I must remind you to not use the
names, initials, rank, or other identifying information of other people in the course of our
interview. Do you have any questions?
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This is a semi-structured interview, there are no right or wrong answers, so please
answer, frankly.
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Questions for Senior Army Leadership #1

1.

Why did the Army create the Battalion Commander Assessment Program (BCAP)?

2. Why was it needed?
3. Why was this the right time for BCAP?
4. Can you please explain the number of officers being considered for BCAP?
5. Can you tell me more about the numbers?

6.

What are some of the reasons officers failed the assessment?

7. Since this is assessing the concept, once implemented will you expect similar results?

8. Is there anything else you would like to add?
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Questions for Senior Army Leadership #2
1. Can you describe the legacy system for selecting officers for Battalion Command?

2.

Can you describe the make-up of the new BCAP interview panels?

3.

What is the length of the BCAP evaluation process?

4. What guidance has Army Chief of Staff James McConville provided?

5. What is the downside for those who are not selected?
6. When did you conduct the first BCAP?
7.

How many officers were considered?

8.

How are the results different from the legacy system?

9.

Can you describe the attributes and traits psychologists would be looking for in evaluating
the candidates?

10. Anything else you want to add?
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Questions for Senior Army Leadership #3
1. Why is BCAP important to the Army?
2.

Why focus on battalion command?

3. How does BCAP differ from the legacy system?
4. Do you consider BCAP to be transformational?
5. Can you tell me more about the assessments?
6. Can you talk about the numbers?
7. Did you have specific goals for BCAP?
8. Did you seek feedback from the candidates completing BCAP?
9. How about the senior Army Leaders, did you get feedback from them as well?

10. What insights can you share from your team running the process?
11. Is there anything else you would like to add?
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Questions for Manager #1

Q1. What is the mission of the Army Talent Management Task Force regarding BCAP?

Q2. What is your role in transforming the battalion commander assessment process:

Q3: Why is there a need for BCAP?

Q4: Can you describe a little bit about the BCAP process?

Q5: What about the personnel involved in conducting the actual BCAP assessment?

Q6: The COVID-19 pandemic is affecting our society, how is it impacting BCAP?

Q7: What is your advice to those candidates in preparing for the BCAP experience?
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Questions for Manager #2
1.

Can you describe the battalion command selection process prior to BCAP (aka legacy)?

2. How was the legacy (CSL) system organized?
3. What did the legacy system focus on?
4. How did the legacy system rank the officers?
5. Were officers able to provide their preferences?
6. How did the Board report the results?
7.

What did Human Resources Command do with the Board results?

8. Did HRC have any other considerations?
9. Is there anything else you would like to add?
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Questions for Manager #3

1.

What is the best way to select the US Army’s future battalion commanders?

2. What are the BCAP effects on the Army?

3. In your opinion, what is the importance of getting it right?

4. Are you aware of the Army proof of concept conducted in June and July 2019?

5. Can you describe some of the assessment areas?

6. I understand it also included a panel interview. Can you speak to that?

7. What can you tell me about the results?

8. What were some of the risks and challenges?

9. Was there any focus on leader development?

10. How do you think this will impact on Army culture?

11. Looking ahead, what do you see?
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Questions for Candidate #1
1. I understand that you participated in one of the first iterations of BCAP. Can you provide
some context about your participation?
2. What do you think are some of the goals of BCAP?
3. Can you tell me a little bit about the other assessments?
4. Can you describe a little more about the Officer Evaluation Reports (OERs)?
5. Anything else about the various assessments?
6. Do you have an opinion about the Army changing the way it selects battalion
commanders?
7. Do you have any other thoughts about the process?
8. What are your final thoughts about BCAP that you are willing to share?
9. Can you share some of the reflections you have when looking back on the process?
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Questions for Candidate #2
1. When were you a BCAP candidate?
2. Do you think BCAP is relevant and potentially effective?
3. Okay, of these three themes, let me drill down on them, beginning with resources?
4. How about the next theme of organizational culture?
5. Lastly, can you expand on the last theme of self-awareness?
6. Is there anything else you want to add?
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Questions for Candidate #3
1. What were the results of the 2020 Battalion Command selections?

2. Can you describe your thoughts about the selection rate for females?

3. What are your thoughts about the transformation of the legacy system to BCAP?

4. Do you have any other thoughts about the data?

5. Can you describe your interest in BCAP?

6. What do you think are some other reasons for the low selection rate of females?

7. Do you think there are any inherent biases in the BCAP process?

8. Are there any final thoughts you would like to share?
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